Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold by Sunstein, Cass Robert
 
Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (2008).
Published Version http://harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/sunstein.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 12:08:53 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10875734
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP   
246 
SECOND AMENDMENT MINIMALISM:  
HELLER AS GRISWOLD 
Cass R. Sunstein
∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
District of Columbia v. Heller1 is the most explicitly and self-
consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.2  
Well over two hundred years since the Framing, the Court has, for es-
sentially the first time, interpreted a constitutional provision with ex-
plicit, careful, and detailed reference to its original public meaning.3 
It would be possible, in this light, to see Heller as a modern incar-
nation of Marbury v. Madison,4 at least as that case is understood by 
some contemporary scholars,5 and to a considerable extent as Chief 
Justice John Marshall wrote it.  In Marbury, the Court also spoke on 
behalf of what it took to be the text, structure, and original meaning of 
the Constitution.6  On one view, Heller represents the full flowering of 
the approach that Chief Justice Marshall imperfectly inaugurated — 
one that has been abandoned at crucial periods in American history.  
To its defenders, Heller speaks honestly and neutrally on behalf of the 
original meaning, and it should be appreciated and applauded for that 
reason.7 
But there is a radically different reading of Heller.  The constitu-
tional text is ambiguous, and many historians believe that the Second 
Amendment does not, in fact, create a right to use guns for nonmilitary 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Orin Kerr, Rich-
ard A. Posner, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a 
previous draft. 
  1  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
  2  Of course, there are other candidates.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).  It is important to note as well that the Heller 
Court embraced a particular species of originalism, one that emphasizes the “original public 
meaning” of the Constitution rather than the “original intention” of its authors.  
  3  I do not mean to suggest that the Court was correct on the historical issue, a question ex-
plored below at pp. 255–57. 
  4  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
  5  See, e.g., ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1989). 
  6  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173–80. 
  7  For an early statement to this effect, see Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution 
Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13.    
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purposes.8  In their view, the Court’s reading is untrue to the relevant 
materials.  If they are right, then it is tempting to understand Heller 
not as Marbury but as a modern incarnation of Lochner v. New York,9 
in which the Court overrode democratic judgments in favor of a dubi-
ous understanding of the Constitution.  On this view, it is no accident 
that the five-Justice majority in Heller consisted of the most conserva-
tive members of the Court (who were all Republican appointees).  Per-
haps Heller is, in the relevant sense, a twenty-first-century version of 
Lochner-style substantive due process, and perhaps it marks the be-
ginning of a long series of confrontations between the Supreme Court 
and the political branches. 
On a third view, this characterization badly misses the mark.   
Heller is more properly characterized as a rerun of the minimalist rul-
ing in Griswold v. Connecticut.10  In Griswold, the Court struck down 
a Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives by married cou-
ples, under circumstances in which the Connecticut law was plainly 
inconsistent with a national consensus.  The Court worked hard to 
support its decision by reference to the standard legal materials,11 but 
the national consensus probably provides the best explanation of what 
the Court did.12  Perhaps Heller is closely analogous.  The Court spoke 
confidently in terms of the original meaning, but perhaps its ruling is 
impossible to understand without attending to contemporary values, 
and in particular to the fact that the provisions that the Court invali-
dated were national outliers. 
In this Comment, I contend that the third view is largely correct, 
and that Heller will, in the fullness of time, be seen as embracing a 
kind of Second Amendment minimalism.  Notwithstanding the Court’s 
preoccupation with constitutional text and history, Heller cannot be 
adequately understood as an effort to channel the document’s original 
public meaning.  The Court may have been wrong on that issue, and 
even if it was right, a further question remains: why was the robust 
individual right to possess guns recognized in 2008, rather than 1958, 
1968, 1978, 1988, or 1998?  And notwithstanding the possible inclina-
tions of the Court’s most conservative members, Heller is not best seen 
as a descendent of Lochner.  In spite of its radically different method-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
AND  THE  ORIGINS  OF  GUN  CONTROL  IN  AMERICA  (2006); Jack N. Rakove, The Second 
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 158 (2000).  See also 
the ambivalent treatment, showing that there are plausible views on both sides, in MARK  V. 
TUSHNET,  OUT  OF  RANGE:  WHY  THE  CONSTITUTION  CAN’T  END  THE  BATTLE  OVER 
GUNS (2007). 
  9  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
  10  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
  11  Id. at 484–85. 
  12  See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 328–29 (1992).    
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ology,  Heller is far closer to Griswold than it is to Marbury or to 
Lochner. 
No less than Griswold, Heller is a narrow ruling with strong mini-
malist features.  And if this view is correct, then the development of 
the gun right, as it is specified over time, will have close parallels to 
the development of the privacy right.  As the law emerges through 
case-by-case judgments, the scope of the right will have as much to do 
with contemporary understandings as with historical ones.  This point 
has general implications for constitutional change in the United States, 
even when the Court contends, in good faith, that it is merely channel-
ing the original meaning or other established sources of constitutional 
meaning. 
II.  HELLER AS MARBURY 
A.  Original Meaning and Blank Slates 
For many years, Justice Scalia has contended that the Constitution 
should be interpreted so as to fit with the original public meaning of 
the relevant provisions.13  In his view, the judge’s duty is to track that 
meaning, not to take account of changing circumstances or new moral 
commitments.  What Justice Scalia seeks is “a rock-solid, unchanging 
Constitution.”14  His interest in originalism is explicitly connected with 
his interest in rule-bound law and in constraining judicial discretion; 
on his account, originalism is uniquely capable of ensuring that consti-
tutional law is not a matter of judicial will or ad hoc, case-by-case 
judgments.15  Indeed, originalism and rule-bound law help to protect 
liberties by stiffening the judicial spine, ensuring respect for constitu-
tional rights even when the political pressure is intense.16  It is in part 
because of his enthusiasm for rule-bound law that Justice Scalia rejects 
the original intention in favor of the original meaning.17  To assess in-
tentions, courts need to ask something subjective, involving what lies 
inside particular people’s heads; to ask about meaning, courts can un-
dertake a more objective inquiry. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  13  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION:  FEDERAL  COURTS AND THE LAW  3 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
  14  Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 13, at 47. 
  15  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
  16  See id. at 1180.  There is a clear connection between this claim and the Court’s rejection of 
interest-balancing in Heller.  See 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (citing id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
  17  Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 13, at 38.     
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Notwithstanding the energy and clarity with which Justice Scalia 
has argued for his approach, Heller is unique; he has never been able 
to embed originalism so explicitly and directly in a majority opinion.18  
On the contrary, originalism has not been a significant theme on either 
the Rehnquist Court or the Roberts Court.19  For this reason, it is 
stunning to see that Heller is a thoroughly originalist opinion — a sig-
nificant development, and one that is at least potentially important for 
the future, certainly of the Second Amendment, and perhaps more 
generally. 
To be sure, the Court’s originalism is less surprising here than it 
would be in other domains.  In the Second Amendment context, the 
Court had sparse precedents20 with which to work; the cases were nei-
ther recent nor carefully reasoned, and it was clear that the Court did 
not much like what it found.21  In a sense, the question in Heller was 
one of first impression, or at least it could be so taken.  In answering 
that question, many judges might be drawn to the original understand-
ing even if they would not consider it, or would not give it a great deal 
of weight, if they were writing on an unclean slate. 
But we should be careful about this point, for it is hardly inevitable 
that the Court would be drawn to originalism even when it lacked 
doctrinal signposts.  After all, circumstances have changed dramati-
cally since the ratification of the Second Amendment, making it tempt-
ing to follow the text but not the original meaning.  The twenty-first-
century United States is radically different from the eighteenth-century 
United States, in a way that seems to complicate and perhaps even to 
confound any form of originalism.22  Compare the First Amendment: 
in approaching the meaning of that amendment in the context of 
commercial advertising, the Court did not ask about the original un-
derstanding, even though the precedents were sparse in that domain as 
well.23  In its first serious encounter with the question of affirmative 
action, the Court’s members spent essentially no time with the original 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  18  In some cases, however, there have been unmistakable originalist features.  See, e.g., Craw-
ford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004).  For a valuable discussion, see Stephanos Bibas, 
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely 
Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 201 (2005). 
  19  See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (nonoriginalist 
opinion by Justice Alito); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (nonoriginalist opin-
ion by Justice Scalia); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (same). 
  20  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542 (1876). 
  21  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814–15. 
  22  See CORNELL, supra note 8; Rakove, supra note 8, at 158. 
  23  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).    
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meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.24  T h e  s a m e  i s  t r u e  o f  t h e  
pivotal cases involving discrimination on the basis of sex.25  T h e  
Court’s decisions involving sexually explicit materials were not 
originalist, even when the Court had few precedents with which to 
work.26  In its first real encounter with the legitimacy of congressional 
grants of standing to citizens as such, the Court decided to invalidate 
such grants — and without saying even a word about the original un-
derstanding.27  Originalism seems to have more appeal when doctrine 
is not developed, but the Court has rarely spoken in originalist terms 
even when doctrine barely exists.28 
Moreover, judges who believe in some kind of “moral reading” of 
the Constitution might attempt to make best moral sense of the rele-
vant provision, rather than to track the understandings of over two 
centuries ago.29  What is noteworthy is that no opinion in Heller ap-
proached the constitutional question in these terms, at least not explic-
itly.  Justice Scalia’s thoroughly originalist opinion commanded a ma-
jority of the Court, and Justice Scalia’s distinctive brand of 
originalism, involving the original public meaning, was clearly ascen-
dant.  Indeed, the dissenters spoke in largely originalist terms as well, 
although Justice Breyer’s plea for balancing had pragmatic as well as 
originalist elements.30 
B.  Marbury, Originalism, and Timing 
Taken as a full-scale vindication of originalist methodology, Heller 
has few clear precedents,31 even in the Founding era.32  An imperfect 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  24  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  For a detailed argument 
that affirmative action is unobjectionable on originalist grounds, see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative 
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). 
  25  See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
  26  See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
  27  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 ( 1992).  For a critique on originalist 
grounds, see Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
  28  For an illuminating discussion, see Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
  29  See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7–15 (1996). 
  30  See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Note that Justice Stevens also em-
phasized judicial precedents, id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting), longstanding traditions, id. at 
2842–45, and the need for judicial deference to reasonable legislative judgments, id. at 2846–47, 
2846 n.39. 
  31  But see supra note 2. 
  32  The Court’s clearest embrace of originalism, in its first century, can be found in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857): 
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or 
impolicy, of these laws.  The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-
making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution.  The 
duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we 
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but highly salient analogy is Marbury.33  In recognizing the power of 
judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall placed a great deal of emphasis 
on the constitutional text and structure.34  True, he did not speak di-
rectly in terms of the original public meaning.  But some of the foun-
dations of his approach were textualist, with his emphasis on the Su-
premacy Clause and the judicial oath.35  Indeed, it would not be 
implausible to say that he was attempting to channel the original un-
derstanding of the text.  Some modern defenses of Marbury contend 
that the Court’s conclusion was fully consistent with originalist meth-
odology.36  Marbury could easily have been written in originalist terms, 
and any such opinion would overlap with Chief Justice Marshall’s 
own. 
I do not mean to say anything controversial about Marbury here.  
But perhaps Heller represents a far more thorough, careful, and so-
phisticated version of Marbury’s approach — one that, well over two 
hundred years since the Founding, attempts humbly and faithfully to 
recover and to implement the original judgment of We the People.37  
In seeing Heller as Marbury, then, I am taking Marbury to be a rea-
sonable rendering of that original judgment, in a case that has unique 
salience in the canon of constitutional law. 
This understanding of Heller is not at all implausible.  The Court’s 
reading of text and history was hardly preposterous;38 whether or not 
the Court’s analysis was convincing,39 it grappled with textual and his-
torical arguments on all sides.  But as a full account of what the Court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent 
and meaning when it was adopted. 
Note that in Dred Scott, the Court spoke in terms of original intentions, as well as original public 
meaning. 
  33  For an illuminating discussion of Marbury, with close reference to its context, see BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE  OF  THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL,  AND 
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 182–88 (2005). 
  34  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (“Thus, the particular phraseology 
of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be 
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”).  
  35  Id. 
  36  See CLINTON, supra note 5.  For a very different understanding, see ACKERMAN, supra 
note 33, at 264–65. 
  37  For a brief suggestion to this effect, see Barnett, supra note 7. 
  38  See T USHNET,  supra note 8, at xv–xvi (suggesting that while the question is close, the  
original understanding is best read to create an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary  
purposes). 
  39  For some doubts on that score from one of the leading historians of the Founding period, see 
Posting of Jack Rakove to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-
from-real-historian.html (June 27, 2008, 20:02).    
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did, the understanding runs into two serious problems.40  The first is 
that the original meaning of the Second Amendment is greatly con-
tested and many historians reject the Court’s conclusion — an issue to 
which I will shortly turn. 
The second problem is less straightforward but more interesting 
and equally fundamental: Even if the Court’s understanding of the 
original public meaning is correct, why did the Court vindicate that 
understanding in 2008?  Why not in 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, or 1998?  
Between  194241 and 2001,42 lower courts had been virtually unani-
mous in rejecting the view that the Second Amendment creates an in-
dividual right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes.  A quiz question: 
when was the first time a lower federal court invoked the Second 
Amendment to invalidate a state or federal law?  Answer: Heller itself, 
in 2007.43  In well over a half-century, the Court had many opportuni-
ties to reject the established view within the lower federal courts; it 
never did so.  Indeed, for many decades, no member of the Court 
showed the slightest inclination to hold that the Second Amendment 
protects the right to have a gun for nonmilitary uses.  Why did the 
Court accept that view in 2008? 
The answer has everything to do with the particular context in 
which the Heller Court wrote — the context that led the Court to be 
composed as it was and to have the inclinations that it did.  In terms 
of judicial as well as public convictions, it would be a mistake to un-
derrate the influence of a powerful and aggressive social movement 
promoting public and judicial recognition of an individual right to 
have guns for nonmilitary purposes.44  In part as a result of the im-
mense influence of that movement, strong national majorities have 
come to favor that right.45  Indeed, national opposition to a ban on 
handguns has been larger and more consistent in recent years than  
in the 1950s,  1960s,  1970s, and 1980s.46  Politicians of both parties 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  40  I put to one side some conceptual issues with attempting the originalist project under 
changed circumstances.  See C ASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  RADICALS  IN  ROBES:  WHY  EXTREME 
RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 68–71 (2005). 
  41  Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942). 
  42  United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). 
  43  Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom., Heller, 128 S. 
Ct. 2783 (2008). 
  44  See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism 
As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).  
  45  See PollingReport.com, Guns, http://pollingreport.com/guns.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008); 
see also Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right To Own Guns, GALLUP, Mar. 27, 
2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-Right-Own-Guns.aspx. 
  46  Gallup Poll Editorial Staff, Gallup Summary: Americans and Gun Control, GALLUP, Apr. 
18, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27229/Gallup-Summary-Americans-Gun-Control.aspx.    
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strongly favor some kind of individual right to have guns,47 and the 
central holding of Heller is thus fully consistent with the view of na-
tional leaders as well as that of most citizens.  It is highly revealing in 
this regard that majorities of both houses of Congress supported a ro-
bust individual right in an amicus brief48 and that both nominees for 
the presidency — John McCain and Barack Obama — greeted Heller 
with general enthusiasm.49 
Indeed, judicial rejection of an individual right to have guns for 
nonmilitary purposes would have produced a high degree of public 
outrage, thus making the Court, and its rejection of that right, a salient 
part of national politics.  Any ruling against an individual right to 
have guns for purposes of self-defense and hunting would have been 
wildly unpopular.  Such a ruling would have polarized the nation.  By 
contrast, Heller itself was met with widespread social approval.  Far 
from creating a firestorm, it was mostly met with reactions ranging 
from relative indifference to enthusiasm. 
Of course, the Court does not merely channel public opinion, and 
hence it is necessary to identify mechanisms that would link the 
Court’s recognition of a robust individual right to a period in which 
most people support that right.50  It  is  s u re l y  re l e v a n t  h e r e t h a t  the 
Court’s composition is determined by the views of the President (and, 
through the power to advise and consent, the Senate), and the Repub-
lican Presidents who appointed the five-member Heller majority were 
strong supporters of a broad Second Amendment right.51  The fact 
that in 2008, the Court was willing to read the Constitution so as to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  47  Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate et al. in Support of Respondent, 
Heller (No. 07-290),  available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/07-290/07-
290.mer.ami.resp.cong.pdf. 
  48  Id. 
  49  Senator McCain responded as follows: “Today’s decision is a landmark victory for Second 
Amendment freedom in the United States. . . . I applaud this decision as well as the overturning 
of the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns and limitations on the ability to use firearms for 
self-defense.”  Posting of Tom Bevan to Real Clear Politics,  http://time-blog.com/real_clear_ 
politics/2008/06/mccain_reacts_to_scotus_gun_de.html (June 26, 2008).  Senator Obama stated: “I 
have always believed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear 
arms . . . . Today’s ruling, the first clear statement on this issue in 127 years, will provide much-
needed guidance to local jurisdictions across the country.  As President, I will uphold the constitu-
tional rights of law-abiding gun-owners, hunters, and sportsmen.”  Id. 
  50  For one account, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3–
6 (1949). 
  51  Ronald Reagan was a member of the National Rifle Association, and he was committed to a 
broad individual right to have guns.  See Chris Cox’s Political Report — Ronald Wilson Reagan, 
www.nraila.org/issues/Articles/Read.aspx?ID=140 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).  George H.W. Bush 
was also an NRA member for decades, although he resigned his membership in 1995.  See John 
Minz, Bush Resigns From NRA, Citing 'Broadside' on Agents, WASH. POST, May 11, 1995, at A1.  
George W. Bush has been strongly committed to a broad individual right.  See NRA Endorses 
George W. Bush for President, NRA  POLITICAL  VICTORY  FUND, Oct. 13,  2004, 
www.nrapvf.org/News/Read.aspx?ID=4614 (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).    
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safeguard that right had everything to do with the social and political 
context in which the Court wrote. 
In short, I am suggesting that even if Heller accurately captured 
the original meaning, the Court’s willingness to do so cannot be ex-
plained in terms that point only to historical accuracy.  In any number 
of areas — affirmative action, sex equality, property rights, commercial 
advertising, standing to sue — the Court could choose, but has not 
chosen, to be originalist.  We also need to ask: Why originalism now, in 
particular?  Why originalism here, in particular?  The most sensible 
answers point to context and culture, and both of these strongly fa-
vored the Court’s conclusion. 
III.  HELLER AS LOCHNER 
In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a maximum hour 
law.52  The Court reasoned that freedom of contract is part of the “lib-
erty” protected by the Due Process Clause, and it found that the state’s 
police power did not extend to maximum hour regulation, which could 
not be justified as either a labor law or a health law.53  In so ruling, 
the Court attempted, in good faith, to justify its conclusion by refer-
ence to the standard legal materials.54  There is no reason to doubt 
that the Court’s members genuinely believed that the legal sources jus-
tified their conclusion.  But it is now widely agreed that Lochner was a 
mistake and even a disgrace, because the Court could not claim ade-
quate legal support for its conclusion and actually entrenched its own, 
controversial view of public policy.55  The general problem with the 
Lochner decision, thus understood, is captured in Justice Holmes’ dis-
senting suggestion that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”56  After Heller, does the Consti-
tution enact the latest position paper of the National Rifle Association?  
The conclusions of the Republican Party on gun control? 
At first glance, it seems reckless and insulting to ask such ques-
tions or to see Heller as a modern incarnation of Lochner, because   
the Court took such pains to attempt to justify its approach by   
reference to constitutional text, structure, and history.  But Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson has objected that Heller suffers from the same de-
fects as Roe v. Wade,57 in an analysis that links Heller with Lochner as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  52  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
  53  Id. at 57–58. 
  54  Id. at 54–56. 
  55  For the Court’s own recognition of this point, see, for example, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726, 728–29 (1963).  For one discussion of the problems with the Court’s entrenching its own pol-
icy views, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
  56  198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
  57  410 U.S. 113 (1973).    
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well.58  In his view, the Heller Court allowed litigants to “bypass the 
ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts.”59  
Rejecting this approach, Judge Wilkinson explicitly invokes Jus-
tice Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Lochner.60 
To know whether it is plausible to see Heller as Lochner, we need 
to know what the claim of analogy is meant to assert.61  On one view, 
which should be congenial to those who approve of Heller, the vice of 
Lochner consisted in a departure from the original meaning of the 
relevant text.  On a different view, the vice of Lochner consisted in in-
validation of a statute when the constitutional text was ambiguous.  Of 
course, there are other possibilities, most prominently the view that the 
vice of Lochner consisted in an aggressive judicial posture in a context 
in which there was no particular reason to think that the democratic 
process was malfunctioning. 
A.  Originalism and Lochnerism 
The Heller Court purported to be originalist, but many historians 
have concluded and even insisted that the Second Amendment did not 
create an individual right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes.  On 
this view, the understanding enshrined in Heller is a product of the na-
tion’s most recent decades, not the Founding period. 
In one of the most elaborate and detailed studies, Saul Cornell con-
cludes that the Second Amendment right did not extend to nonmilitary 
uses of guns.62  He finds, for example, that the right did not cover the 
use of guns for purposes of hunting; in his account, the suggestion that 
it did cover such use was expressed on only one isolated occasion in 
the Founding era, and even that reference, in a dissent in the Pennsyl-
vania ratifying convention, was obscure.63  More generally, Cornell 
concludes that the “original understanding of the Second Amendment 
was neither an individual right of self-defense nor a collective right of 
the states, but rather a civic right that guaranteed that citizens would 
be able to keep and bear those arms needed to meet their legal obliga-
tion to participate in a well-regulated militia.”64  In Cornell’s view, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  58  See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009) (manuscript on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  59  Id. (manuscript at 1).  
  60  Id. (manuscript at 2–3). 
  61  There are many different accounts of the vice of Lochner; I emphasize conventional ones 
here.  For discussion of what might be wrong with Lochner, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14–15 (1980); David A. Strauss, Why Was 
Lochner Wrong?,  70 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  373 ( 2003); and Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy,  87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
  62  CORNELL, supra note 8. 
  63  Id. at 51–52. 
  64  Id. at 2.    
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understanding endorsed in Heller is simply wrong; the Second 
Amendment, as originally understood, did not create a right to have 
guns for nonmilitary purposes. 
Similarly, Jack Rakove, a Pulitzer Prize winner and one of the most 
careful students of the period, concludes that the purpose of the Sec-
ond Amendment was merely to affirm “the essential proposition — or 
commonplace — that liberty fared better when republican polities re-
lied upon a militia of citizen soldiers for their defense, rather than risk 
the dire consequences of sustaining a permanent military establish-
ment.”65  Rakove believes that the Second Amendment must be under-
stood in the context of the effort to preserve state militias; he rejects a 
broader understanding of the right created by the amendment.   
Rakove flatly rejects the position adopted by the Court in Heller.66 
In his dissenting opinion in Heller, Justice Stevens outlined the nar-
rower reading of the Second Amendment, focused on military uses of 
firearms; he provided numerous and detailed references to the primary 
and secondary materials.67  The much more important point is that 
many historians believe that he is right.  The Heller Court itself relied 
on numerous academic writings by law professors, as did Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion,68 but few members of that group are 
trained historians.  More commonly, they are advocates with a rooting 
interest in one or another position.  There is a marked difference (in 
my view) between the care, sensitivity to context, and relative neutral-
ity generally shown by historians and the advocacy-oriented, conclu-
sion-driven, and often tendentious treatments characteristic of aca-
demic lawyers on both sides of the Second Amendment debate.  As 
Rakove writes:  
[H]istorical operations in the Second Amendment theater of combat are of-
ten mounted by campaigners not intimately familiar with the terrain.   
These are raiders who know what they are looking for, and having found 
it, they care little about collateral damage to the surrounding countryside 
that historians better know as context.69 
Law office history plays a large role in the law reviews and, thanks to 
Heller, in the pages of the United States Reports.  To be sure, the 
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  65  Rakove, supra note 8, at 158.  In the process of supporting this argument, Rakove offers a 
sharp challenge to influential work by academic lawyers.  See id. at 156–59. 
  66  See id.;  see also Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al. in Support of Petitioners, 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ 
briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-290_PetitionerAmCuRakove.pdf; Posting of the New York Times to Times 
Topics, http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/qa-jack-rakove-on-heller-and-history (June 26, 
2008 18:55); Rakove, supra note 39. 
  67  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  68  See id. at 2789, 2795, 2798–99, 2803, 2820 (majority opinion); id. at 2848–49, 2866 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
  69  Rakove, supra note 8, at 105.    
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competing arguments by the Court and Justice Stevens are impres-
sively detailed.  But the subtlety, nuance, acknowledgement of counter-
arguments, and (above all) immersion in Founding-era debates, char-
acteristic of good historical work, cannot be found in Heller. 
This should not be a surprise.  No member of the Court is a histo-
rian.  None can claim to be anything like a true specialist in the 
Founding period.70  In these circumstances, it is more than a little dis-
turbing to find that the most conservative members of the Court con-
cluded, apparently with great confidence, that the Second Amendment 
creates an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary purposes, 
whereas the less conservative members of the Court concluded, appar-
ently with equal confidence, that the Second Amendment does no such 
thing.  Heller is plausibly taken as a great triumph less for historical 
recovery than for a social movement determined to create a robust in-
dividual right to have guns.71 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the analogy to 
Lochner is highly imperfect, at least if we see Lochner as a case that 
was wrong because it so plainly defied the original meaning.  The 
Lochner Court did not take pains to defend its decision in textual and 
historical terms, and it is most doubtful that the decision could be so 
defended.  By contrast, Heller offers ample detail on the original 
meaning, and Heller could be so defended, notwithstanding the exis-
tence of intense debate.  For this reason, the analogy to Lochner seems 
to fail if we understand the analogy to be based on a judgment that 
the twentieth-century Court flagrantly departed from originalist meth-
odology, properly applied. 
B.  Thayerism and Lochnerism 
It is not standard, however, to say that the flaw of Lochner was 
that it departed from originalism.  Let us understand Lochner in a dif-
ferent way, one that invokes one of the greatest and most influential 
essays in the history of American law (and one that has received a 
prominent and powerful modern defense72).  In that essay, James 
Bradley Thayer argues that courts should uphold national legislation 
unless it is plainly and unambiguously in violation of the Constitu-
tion.73  Thayer notes that because the American Constitution is often 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  70  This point raises a general problem for originalism: if the Constitution is to be construed in 
accordance with the original public meaning, there is a serious question at to whether lawyers are 
competent for the task. 
  71  See Siegel, supra note 44. 
  72  See A DRIAN  VERMEULE,  JUDGING  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  AN  INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
  73  See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).     
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ambiguous, those who decide on its meaning must inevitably exercise 
discretion.  Laws that “will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body 
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another[, because] the constitu-
tion often admits of different interpretations; . . . there is often a range 
of choice and judgment.”74  In Thayer’s view, “whatever choice is ra-
tional is constitutional.”75 
Thayer’s argument, in brief, is that courts should strike down laws 
only “when those who have the right to make laws have not merely 
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, — so clear that it is 
not open to rational question.”76  The question for courts “is not one of 
the mere and simple preponderance of reasons for or against, but of 
what is very plain and clear, clear beyond a reasonable doubt.”77  In so 
arguing, Thayer emphasizes two points.  The first is the fallibility of 
federal judges.  When judges conclude that a law is unconstitutional, 
they are of course relying on their own interpretation, and they might 
be wrong.  Judges are learned in the law, certainly.  But should we 
conclude that judicial interpretations are necessarily correct? 
Thayer’s second point is that a strong judiciary might harm de-
mocracy itself.  He suggests that if judges become too aggressive, the 
moral vigilance of elected officials might weaken.  Thayer laments that 
“our doctrine of constitutional law has had a tendency to drive out 
questions of justice and right, and to fill the minds of legislators with 
thoughts of mere legality, of what the constitution allows.”78  Indeed, 
things have often been worse, for “even in the matter of legality, they 
have felt little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts will 
correct it.”79  Thayer seeks to place the responsibility for justice on 
democracy, where it belongs.  “Under no system can the power of 
courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies else-
where.”80  Modern Thayerians might well emphasize this point in the 
context of the Second Amendment as elsewhere, suggesting that regu-
lation of guns raises complex moral and pragmatic considerations that 
should be engaged directly, not as a matter of “mere legality.” 
On a Thayerian view, the problem with the Lochner decision was 
that the Court invalidated legislation even though the constitutional 
infirmity was far from plain.  On this view, Heller runs into exactly the 
same problem.  We have seen that reasonable people, including rea-
sonable historians, fiercely debate the meaning of the Second Amend-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  74  Id. at 144. 
  75  Id. 
  76  Id. 
  77  Id. at 151. 
  78  Id. at 155. 
  79  Id. at 155–56. 
  80  Id. at 156.    
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ment and that the view defended by Justice Stevens — that the right 
extends only to military uses of guns — is hardly without support.81  
In these circumstances, Thayerians will insist that the Court owed a 
duty of respect to a democratic judgment. 
C.  Guns, Carolene Products, and Politics 
It is true that the Thayerian reading of Lochner cuts very broadly, 
and, for most observers, unacceptably so.  If Thayer was right, Heller 
is surely wrong, but the same must be said about many other decisions 
accepted by most of Heller’s likely critics, including (for example) 
Brown v. Board of Education82 (banning racial segregation), Califano 
v. Goldfarb83 (striking down sex discrimination), and Boumediene v. 
Bush84 (vindicating the right to habeas corpus).  Almost no one is a 
universal Thayerian.85  If Heller is to be treated as a modern incarna-
tion of Lochner for less-than-universal Thayerians, then we must spec-
ify a less-than-universal domain for Thayerism, one that would reject 
both decisions, but allow a more aggressive judicial approach in many 
areas.  In the most famous footnote in all of constitutional law, the 
Court suggested such a possibility in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co.,86 indicating that a more aggressive approach would be justi-
fied when there was some kind of defect in majoritarian processes.87  
John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust88 elaborates an approach of 
this kind, which is supported by an illuminating footnote from Justice 
Stevens as well.89 
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  81  CORNELL, supra note 8; Rakove, supra note 8.  The existence of ambiguity and reasonable 
disagreement underpins Judge Wilkinson’s claim that Heller is closely analogous to Roe.  See Wil-
kinson, supra note 58. 
  82  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  83  430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
  84  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
  85  The word “almost” is necessary because of VERMEULE, supra note 72. 
  86  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
  87  Id. at 153 n.4 (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”). 
  88  ELY, supra note 61. 
  89  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2846 n.39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was just a few years after the 
decision in Miller that Justice Frankfurter (by any measure a true judicial conservative) warned 
of the perils that would attend this Court’s entry into the ‘political thicket’ of legislative district-
ing.  The equally controversial political thicket that the Court has decided to enter today is quali-
tatively different from the one that concerned Justice Frankfurter: While our entry into that 
thicket was justified because the political process was manifestly unable to solve the problem of 
unequal districts, no one has suggested that the political process is not working exactly as it 
should in mediating the debate between the advocates and opponents of gun control. . . . It is, 
however, clear to me that adherence to a policy of judicial restraint would be far wiser than the 
bold decision announced today.” (citations omitted) (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 
(1946) (plurality opinion))).     
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On this understanding, the Thayerian view is generally correct, but 
a more intrusive approach from the Court is justified (only) when the 
democratic process is not functioning well, in the sense that certain 
rights and groups are at particular risk.  Perhaps an aggressive ap-
proach can be justified in (for example) sorting out ambiguities in the 
Equal Protection Clause in Brown, but not in sorting out ambiguities 
in the Second Amendment in Heller.  There is no special reason for an 
aggressive judicial role in protecting against gun control, in light of the 
fact that opponents of such control have considerable political power 
and do not seem to be at a systematic disadvantage in the democratic 
process.  The Carolene Products approach offers no support for Heller.  
Indeed, the widespread commitment to an individual right to own 
guns itself operates as a safeguard against excessive or unjustified gun 
control laws. 
The  Carolene Products approach is of course controversial, espe-
cially to those who favor the originalist methodology of Heller.  To 
those who embrace originalism, judges must follow that methodology, 
and considerations involving deference to the democratic process, or its 
limits, are irrelevant.  At this point, we seem to have reached a dead 
end.  On some accounts of what was wrong with Lochner, Heller is 
analogous.  The question is whether those accounts are correct. 
IV.  HELLER AS GRISWOLD 
In Griswold, the Court protected an individual right that enjoyed 
broad popular support, at the expense of a law that counted as a na-
tional outlier.  In Heller, the Court did the same thing.  In Griswold, 
the Court proceeded in minimalist fashion, with its holding focusing 
narrowly on the law before it.  The same is true of the Court’s ap-
proach in Heller.  Just as Griswold reflected a kind of privacy mini-
malism, Heller signals the arrival of Second Amendment minimalism.  
These conclusions have strong implications for the future development 
of Second Amendment doctrine. 
A.  Rationalizing Griswold 
In Griswold, the Court struck down Connecticut’s ban on the use 
of contraceptives by married couples.90  The Court struggled mightily 
to find a textual source for its conclusion.  It explored a range of provi-
sions that might be seen to protect some kind of “privacy,”91 and it 
urged that the right to use contraceptives fell within “penumbras” or 
“emanations” from the Bill of Rights.92  But constitutional provisions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  90  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
  91  Id. at 482–83. 
  92  Id. at 484.    
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have domains, not “penumbras” or “emanations,” and hence almost no 
one defends Griswold as originally written.  It is an understatement to 
say that the Court’s analysis has not survived the test of time.93 
Three other rationales for Griswold have received respectful atten-
tion.  The first, drawing on the work of Alexander Bickel, emphasizes 
desuetude.94  The Connecticut law at issue was enacted long before the 
Court’s decision, it was not much enforced,95 and under these circum-
stances, it might be taken to have “lapsed.”  To be sure, a great deal of 
work must be done to show how this idea can be made to justify 
Griswold on constitutional grounds; no constitutional provision de-
clares statutes invalid because they are infrequently enforced, anach-
ronistic, or both.96  But perhaps the Due Process Clause, in its purely 
procedural sense, is sufficient.  Perhaps it could be said that a law vio-
lates that clause if it is so wildly out of step with prevailing social 
norms that its enforcement is necessarily sporadic and therefore un-
predictable, in a way that compromises the rule of law.97 
The second rationale, pressed by Justice Harlan, emphasizes the 
grounding of substantive due process in tradition.98  Perhaps the sanc-
tity of marriage is honored by tradition, and perhaps the tradition, 
which should not be taken as static, is fatally inconsistent with the 
Connecticut law.99  On this view, substantive due process is rooted in 
longstanding social understandings, and the tradition of respect for 
marital privacy requires a powerful justification for any intrusion.   
The underlying claim might be that courts should not be licensed to 
define “liberty” as they see fit, and that if a certain conception of lib-
erty is sanctified by tradition, it has a kind of epistemic credential.100 
A third rationale, prominently suggested by Judge Richard Posner, 
is that the Connecticut law was fatally out of step with the national 
consensus.101  On this view, the Griswold Court was acting to vindi-
cate that consensus against an outlier.  Indeed, Justice Harlan himself 
invoked this point, urging that for him, the “conclusive” factor was 
“the utter novelty of [the state's] enactment.  Although the Federal 
Government and many States have at one time or other had on their 
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  93  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (understanding sexual privacy as part of 
liberty, and not stressing penumbras and emanations). 
  94  See A LEXANDER  M.  BICKEL,  THE  LEAST  DANGEROUS  BRANCH:  THE  SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 148–56 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
  95  See POSNER, supra note 12, at 325–26. 
  96  See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, for one effort. 
  97  For discussion, see id. 
  98  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
  99  Id. at 553. 
  100  See Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543 (2008). 
  101  See POSNER, supra note 12, at 329.    
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books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contracep-
tives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a 
crime.”102 
Here too, of course, a great deal of work would be necessary to 
demonstrate why and when the Due Process Clause should be con-
strued to give authority to a national consensus or to raise serious 
doubts about national outliers.  Perhaps the basic claim is that if a law 
is a genuine outlier, there is reason to doubt whether it is grounded on 
a firm foundation; an intrusion on liberty that lacks anything like 
broad support might lack epistemic credentials, simply because and to 
the extent that it is so unusual.  On this view, Judge Posner’s approach 
is a close cousin of Justice Harlan’s, and it is no surprise that Justice 
Harlan invoked the point in the context of an opinion emphasizing the 
importance of tradition. 
The Court itself has often rooted its analysis in Justice Harlan’s 
approach,103 but Judge Posner’s understanding of Griswold fits well 
with a broader fact about the arc of constitutional law.  The Court 
rarely points to the importance of a national consensus or suggests that 
it is in any sense responsive to what most people think.  But the devel-
opment of doctrine, over time, unquestionably shows that kind of re-
sponsiveness.104  As a clear example, very much in line with this un-
derstanding of Griswold, consider Lawrence v. Texas.105  In that case, 
the Court was even willing to invoke “an emerging awareness that lib-
erty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex” in invalidating 
a ban on same-sex sexual relations.106  Both historians107 and political 
scientists108 have shown that the connections between judicial rulings 
and public convictions are far more pervasive than is usually thought.  
Consider Brown v. Board of Education,109 invalidating racial seg-
regation; Loving v. Virginia,110 striking down bans on racial intermar-
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  102  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), incorporated by reference in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
  103  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (refusing to recognize a right to 
physician-assisted suicide due to historical disapproval of the practice of assisting suicide).  But 
see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (rejecting limitation of due process clause to tra-
ditional mores). 
  104  See M ICHAEL  J.  KLARMAN,  FROM  JIM  CROW  TO  CIVIL  RIGHTS:  THE  SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL  EQUALITY  5 ( 2004); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court As a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).  
  105  539 U.S. 558. 
  106  Id. at 572. 
  107  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 104. 
  108  See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 104. 
  109  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
  110  388 U.S. 1 (1967).    
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riage; Reed v. Reed,111 inaugurating the constitutional attack on laws 
discriminating on the basis of sex; Craig v. Boren112 and United States 
v. Virginia,113 cementing the ban on such laws; and Romer v. Evans,114 
striking down a highly unusual Colorado state constitutional amend-
ment precluding state or local action banning measures forbidding dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  In these cases, and 
many more, it would be reasonable to suggest that the Court’s decision 
was, in an important sense, insisting that states must obey a national 
consensus. 
Heller can be seen in the same light.  As I have noted, a strong ma-
jority of Americans now supports the individual right to own guns for 
nonmilitary purposes.115  At the same time, the law at issue in Heller 
was among the most draconian in the nation — a genuine national 
outlier.116  The Heller Court might be understood as reacting to the 
District of Columbia law in the same way that the Griswold Court re-
acted to the Connecticut law, with skepticism about an intrusion that 
departs so radically from the general practice and hence the national 
consensus.  Recall here that both presidential candidates — John 
McCain and Barack Obama — responded to the Heller decision with 
statements reflecting their support for the Court’s conclusion. 
To be sure, there are significant differences between the Connecti-
cut law at issue in Griswold and the District of Columbia law at issue 
in Heller.  The Connecticut provision was old,117 making the claim of 
desuetude plausible.  The Griswold Court could even have been said to 
have engaged in a project of “modernization,” in a way that fits with 
some general tendencies in constitutional law.118  By contrast, the Dis-
trict of Columbia provision was new, suggesting that the Court was 
not merely vindicating a national judgment, but also challenging a de-
parture from standard understandings of appropriate gun control legis-
lation.  A doctrine that would authorize challenges to recent depar-
tures and innovations raises quite different considerations from a 
doctrine that merely authorizes attacks on anachronistic laws.  In this 
respect, Bickel’s understanding of Griswold offers no help in Heller.  
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  111  404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
  112  429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
  113  518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
  114  517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
  115  See sources cited supra note 45. 
  116  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the 
severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”). 
  117  See POSNER, supra note 12, at 325.  Similarly, at the time of Lawrence, most state anti-
sodomy laws were several decades old and rarely enforced.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
570, 572 (2003). 
  118  See David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in 
Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REV. 761, 762 (2004).    
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What I am suggesting is a more general point: Heller is quite similar to 
Griswold in the critical sense that both decisions operated in accor-
dance with a national consensus at the expense of a law that counted 
as a sharp deviation from it. 
There is a possible response here.  Whenever the Court begins a 
new area of constitutional doctrine, its initial step is likely to be analo-
gous to Griswold.  One reason is sensible litigation strategy; if the goal 
is to convince the Court to embark on a new path, the best strategy is 
usually to find an outlier and ask the Court to invalidate it in a way 
that leaves a door for future expansion.  And if the Court itself is initi-
ating a new avenue for potential invalidations, it is likely to begin nar-
rowly and in a way that does not fit badly with public convictions, 
thus providing an analogy to Griswold.  On this view, Griswold is 
likely to be the near-universal analogy whenever the Court embarks on 
a new path. 
This response might be right, but it is not exactly an objection.  If 
it is right, it suggests a general point of considerable interest.  It is true 
that minimalism (at least in the sense of narrowness), alongside consis-
tency with national commitments and invalidation of outliers, is a 
common starting point for doctrinal innovation.  But if this point holds 
true for Heller, it suggests that despite its length and ambition, and its 
explicit originalism, the ruling fits with a number of decisions, most 
conspicuously Griswold, in which a new departure was drawn in nar-
row terms that fit well with public convictions. 
It is also true that the District of Columbia law at issue in Heller 
could have been overridden by Congress at any time, unlike many 
state enactments.  If Congress enacts a law that intrudes on privacy, or 
that regulates guns, it would be singularly odd to invalidate that law 
as a “national outlier.”  But there is a large difference between a na-
tional enactment from Congress and an enactment governing the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  The latter reflects political pressures and dynamics 
that are not genuinely national, but unique to the District.  When 
Congress fails to override the law of the District, its inaction cannot 
plausibly be taken as a reflection of national will.  In these circum-
stances, it is perfectly legitimate to treat legislation for the District as a 
kind of state law, and to conclude that for better or for worse, it may 
indeed count as a national outlier. 
B.  Questions and Puzzles 
Of course, this understanding of the Court’s role raises many ques-
tions and doubts.  The first is empirical: what mechanisms link consti-
tutional doctrine to a national consensus?  The most obvious answer 
involves the appointments process.  That process ensures that the    
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views of the Justices have some connection to political will.119  Justices 
also live in society and are inevitably influenced by what other people 
in society think.120  While judicial rulings are hardly a direct product 
of public opinion, there are clear links between what Justices do and 
what the public believes.121  Notwithstanding the Court’s emphasis on 
what it took to be the original understanding of the Second Amend-
ment, Heller is a clear example of these links. 
There are also normative questions: Why does a national consensus 
matter?  Why is it relevant to the Due Process Clause, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Second Amendment, or anything else?  Why and 
when should the Court strike down national outliers, rather than per-
mitting them as a form of legitimate and even desirable experimenta-
tion?  As I have suggested, the consensus may have epistemic value; if 
most people believe that X is true, X may well be true, certainly under 
favorable conditions.  At least it might be said that if, in a democratic 
society, a national consensus supports some kind of individual right to 
own guns, the risks associated with recognition of that right are less 
likely to be terribly high.  For purposes of law, the relevance of this 
point depends on the appropriate theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion.122  Originalists will be puzzled about the idea that a national con-
sensus matters unless the original understanding suggests that it does. 
There are also legitimate questions about federalism, experimenta-
tion, and divergent norms.  Certainly national outliers cannot be said 
to be invalid as such.  Suppose that the District of Columbia seeks to 
embark on a path that differs from that of Montana and Georgia, or 
for that matter that is unique or nearly so.  Should we not acknowl-
edge the possibility (likelihood!) that it is responding to the distinctive 
values and information of its own citizens and representatives, in a 
way that deserves respect?  Today’s outlier is often tomorrow’s norm.  
But prominent theories of interpretation do make a place for public 
will, most plausibly on the theory that at least in some domains, wide-
spread social convictions convey information about the proper content 
of rights.123  Indeed, judicial reliance on such convictions might even 
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  119  See Dahl, supra note 104, at 284–86. 
  120  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (forthcoming 2009). 
  121  See Dahl, supra note 104, at 284–85; cf. PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
TROVERSY 8–9 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the effects of Supreme Court deci-
sions on public opinion). 
  122  Related issues are discussed in detail in SUNSTEIN, supra note 120. 
  123  See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: 
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Y ALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973) (“The Court’s task is to ascertain the 
weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal 
one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law.”).    
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be counted as a form of “popular constitutionalism.”124  Both Griswold 
and Heller (and Brown, and Lawrence, and Reed, among many others) 
can be seen as reflections of popular constitutionalism, even if the 
Heller Court hardly spoke in those terms. 
Even if it is correct to see Heller as a reflection of national convic-
tions, a related problem remains: Could the Court have defended its 
opinion in the terms sketched here?  Could it have done so in Gris-
wold?  Surely it is revealing that the Court did not attempt to do so in 
either case — and that it is unusual for the Court to acknowledge the 
relevance of the national consensus.125  Suppose that we accept the 
publicity principle, in accordance with which public institutions should 
not root their judgments in considerations that they could not defend 
in public.126  If so, the Court ought not to resolve cases by reference to 
arguments that it could not justify publicly.  The only possible re-
sponse to this objection is that in at least some variation, the approach 
I am sketching could indeed be offered by the Court.127  In fact, I am 
willing to predict that in some domains, it will be offered in the future.  
And even when a national consensus is not explicitly invoked, it is of-
ten at work. 
There is an important historical difference to be pondered as well.  
Heller is the product of a mature current of constitutional thought, 
spurred not only by private groups, but also by committed academics.  
This current of thought has become prominent in national politics and 
culture and, by 2008, had established itself as thoroughly main-
stream.128  In sharp contrast, Griswold was the result of an early effort 
by an incipient movement for reproductive rights and sex equality, and 
this movement had yet to become highly visible on the nation’s cul-
tural viewscreen.129  In this sense, Heller has far more in common with 
Brown than with Griswold — in the particular sense that Brown, like 
Heller, was the culmination of a long process of advocacy, in a self-
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  124  See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
  125  The Court occasionally does refer to such a consensus in the Eighth Amendment context, 
see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650–53 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
564 (2005), but the word “unusual” in the amendment provides a textual hook for that approach 
in these cases.  See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (considering the general practice 
of states in reaching the conclusion that the Texas anti-sodomy law was unconstitutional). 
  126  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133, 453–54 (1971).  
  127  Cf.  Lawrence,  539 U.S. at 571–72 (“[O]ur laws and traditions in the past half-
century . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons 
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 682–83 (1996) (emphasizing the unusual nature of the provision that the Court invali-
dated). 
  128  See Siegel, supra note 44. 
  129  See J OHN  W.  JOHNSON,  GRISWOLD  V.  CONNECTICUT:  BIRTH  CONTROL  AND  THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY (2005).    
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conscious effort to entrench a certain understanding of the Constitu-
tion in the interest of social reform.130  In short, Heller and Griswold 
have distinctive sociologies.  While the two were both responsive to 
public convictions, their cultural backdrops were radically different. 
Finally, there are questions of judicial competence: How will the 
Court identify the national consensus, if it is relevant?  Ought the Jus-
tices to consult opinion polls?  To survey state law?  I cannot answer 
such questions here.  The goal is to understand Heller, not to defend it.  
My principal suggestion is that in its vindication of a national com-
mitment against a provision that starkly departed from it, Heller is 
closely analogous to Griswold. 
C.  Heller’s Minimalism 
Minimalists favor small steps, and they reject wide rulings and 
theoretical ambition.  In the end, Griswold was a conspicuously mini-
malist opinion.131  This is so in the sense that it did not adopt a theo-
retically ambitious understanding of privacy or offer a great deal of 
guidance about the scope of the right.  Despite its rhetoric, the Court 
took a small step and narrowly focused on the particular provision at 
issue.  The holding involved the right to use contraceptives within 
marriage.  The Court did not resolve or even speak to the question of 
whether there is a right to purchase contraceptives within marriage, 
whether any right to use or purchase contraceptives applies outside of 
marriage, or whether any such right is part of a right to sexual activity 
as such.  And notwithstanding its apparent sweep, the Heller Court’s 
opinion had unmistakable minimalist elements.  To be sure, the opin-
ion displays a high degree of theoretical depth; with its explicitly 
originalist path, the Court adopted a particular method and did not 
seek an incompletely theorized agreement on its approach.132  But the 
Court focused the key parts of its analysis on the particular provisions 
at issue.133  Indeed, the ruling itself was exceedingly narrow.  More-
over, the Court left numerous questions undecided. 
Most obviously, the Court suggested that the Second Amendment 
right has clear limitations.  In the Court’s words, “nothing in our opin-
ion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbid-
ding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
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  130  For a history of the social reform movement leading up to Brown, see RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMER-
ICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2d ed. 2006).  
  131  For a definition of minimalism, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix–xi (1999). 
  132  On the distinction between shallowness and narrowness, see id. at 16–19. 
  133  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817–19.    
268  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 122:246  
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.”134  To this the Court added that “the 
sorts of weapons protected [by the amendment] were those ‘in common 
use at the time.’”135  In its view, “that limitation is fairly supported by 
the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and 
unusual weapons.’”136  It follows that certain unusual or especially 
dangerous weapons, such as sawed-off shotguns, are also outside the 
domain of the Second Amendment.  In these ways, the Court specified 
the validity of a number of actual or imaginable limitations on the 
right. 
To be sure, these disclaimers are not, precisely, a form of minimal-
ism; they do not leave the nature of the right unclear.  They trim, 
rather than refuse to decide.137  But the Court acknowledged that its 
decision was, in some respects, quite narrow and that much remains to 
be resolved.  After offering an account of measures on which it did not 
mean to cast doubt, the Court added an important footnote: “We iden-
tify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; 
our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”138  In addition, the Court 
was sensitive to Justice Breyer’s objection that its ruling left a great 
deal open: “[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth ex-
amination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clar-
ify the entire field.”139  To support this point, the Court referred to its 
first decision involving religious liberty, Reynolds v. United States,140 
acknowledging, with understatement and an unmistakable dose of 
irony, that the Court’s ruling there did not “[leave] that area in a state 
of utter certainty.”141 
Notwithstanding the Court’s emphasis on historical markers, it is 
emphatically true that Heller leaves many questions open.  To be sure, 
the Court squarely rejected the case-by-case interest balancing urged 
by Justice Breyer.142  But consider three fundamental issues that the 
Court did not resolve.  First, the Court did not decide whether the 
Second Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and thus made applicable to the states.143  Second, the Court did not 
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  134  Id. at 2816–17 (footnote omitted). 
  135  Id. at 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
  136  Id. at 2817 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49). 
  137  See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2009). 
  138  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26. 
  139  Id. at 2821. 
  140  98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
  141  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
  142  Id. (citing id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
  143  In an opaque passage, the Court said, “With respect to [the nineteenth-century case of 
United States v.] Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by 
this case, we note that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the 
States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later 
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settle on a level of scrutiny for restrictions on the Second Amendment 
right.144  Third, the Court did not come close to specifying the scope of 
the right.  We know that “dangerous and unusual weapons” can be 
forbidden, and this idea undergirds the conclusion that “the sorts of 
weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’”  But how, 
precisely, does this idea bear on modern questions, especially in light of 
the fact that the weapons at issue are necessarily modern ones?  
The Court’s answer here is opaque: “And there will be time enough 
to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we 
have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”145  Re-
jecting interest-balancing, the Court did say that the Second Amend-
ment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”146  But 
what exactly does that abstract phrase mean?  How will it be specified 
in the future?  Is interest-balancing appropriate or mandatory outside 
of the home?  The Court did not say. 
D.  Evaluating Heller As Griswold 
We have seen that on purely originalist grounds, the question re-
solved in Heller was not straightforward, and reasonable people be-
lieve that the Court was wrong.147  In these circumstances, the Court 
might have used two tiebreakers.  First, it might have emphasized the 
importance of respecting longstanding practices by federal and state 
legislatures and by federal courts, which seemed to suggest that the 
Second Amendment right is limited to military uses of guns.  That un-
derstanding of the amendment was reflected in numerous lower fed-
eral court decisions, so much so as to represent an entrenched view.148  
The same view seems to fit with many legislative practices as well.149  
For followers of Edmund Burke, who believe less in the original mean-
ing than in the need to follow social understandings over time,150 the 
legislative and judicial practices might well have been invoked to re-
ject a right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes. 
Second, the Court might have concluded that, for Thayerian rea-
sons, the democratic process should be given room to maneuver, at 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cases.  Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), and Miller v. Texas, 153 
U.S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Govern-
ment.”  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23 (parallel citations omitted). 
  144  Id. at 2817–18, 2821. 
  145  Id. at 2821. 
  146  Id.  
  147  See TUSHNET, supra note 8 (suggesting that reasonable arguments exist on both sides). 
  148  See the recitation in Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 n.2 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
  149  See TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 73–126. 
  150  See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).    
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least in the face of reasonable doubt.  Without any particular democ-
ratic malfunction specially justifying judicial intervention — for ex-
ample, without any kind of claim on the basis of Carolene Products — 
a Thayerian approach would have had considerable appeal.  Such an 
approach receives additional support from the fact that Heller will in-
evitably require federal courts, with limited guidance from Heller it-
self, to play an exceedingly difficult role in assessing the predictably 
numerous challenges to gun control legislation.  Perhaps the Court 
should have adopted a militia-focused interpretation of the Second 
Amendment that was, at the least, textually and historically plausible, 
and that would prevent the federal judiciary from entering an unusual 
political thicket in which the democratic process does not seem to be 
working poorly. 
There is, however, an important countervailing consideration.  For 
the last decades, and perhaps for much longer, a robust individual 
right to use guns has become an entrenched part of American cul-
ture.151  Many Americans believe that this right is both fundamental 
and essential — as much so, in its way, as the right to freedom of 
speech.  They believe that the right to have guns is a crucial safeguard 
against private threats and even against government itself.  Gun own-
ership is, for them, the ultimate form of security — an essential part of 
their identity and self-understanding.152  About forty million Ameri-
cans — more than one in eight — are gun owners.153  In these circum-
stances, it is no light thing for the Supreme Court to announce that 
tens of millions of Americans are simply mistaken, and that they hold 
their guns only at the government’s sufferance. 
Of course, it is legitimate to ask whether this consideration is im-
portant or even relevant.  Should the Supreme Court interpret the 
Constitution to create rights simply because people understand the 
Constitution to create rights — and would be offended or worse if the 
Court failed to do so?  After all, the Court did not recognize a right to 
Social Security benefits,154 or to obscene materials,155 o r  t o  c e r t a i n  
kinds of property protection,156 even though millions of Americans in-
sist, with great conviction, that they have such rights.  But the right to 
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  151  For different but illuminating perspectives, see JOAN  BURBICK,  GUN  SHOW  NATION: 
GUN CULTURE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); and CORNELL, supra note 8. 
  152  Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory 
of Gun-Risk Perceptions,  151 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1291 ( 2003) (arguing that an individual’s beliefs 
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  153  Christine Cadena, Presidential Campaign Platforms 2008: The Issues of Gun Control,  
ASSOCIATED  CONTENT, July 2,  2007, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/294410/ 
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  154  See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
  155  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
  156  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).    
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have guns is different.  It has a unique status in contemporary Ameri-
can culture; it has been recognized as a right, and with great intensity, 
by citizens and politicians of both parties.  An interpretation of the 
Founding document that denied the right would likely create forms of 
public outrage, political polarization, and social disruption that have 
not been seen in many decades.  Out of respect for the intensely felt 
convictions of millions of Americans, and with concern for the risks of 
potential disruption, perhaps the Court should hesitate before denying 
the right. 
In these circumstances, Heller starts to look e ven more like Gris-
wold; recall that the latter case involved the right to marital intimacy, 
which (not to put too fine a point on it) is also understood to be fun-
damental by millions of Americans.  In many ways, Heller may be no 
less defensible than Griswold on the ground I am exploring.  As I have 
emphasized, it is certainly true that the Court did not write in these 
terms, and it would be speculative in the extreme to suggest that any 
member of the Court even thought about the Second Amendment 
question in this way.  I am not contending that the explanation I am 
offering is ultimately sufficient.  In the end, however, I believe that this 
explanation provides the strongest basis for understanding what made 
Heller possible — and it also offers a ground for seeing what makes 
Heller appealing. 
V.  A BRIEF NOTE ON IMPLICATIONS 
What might be expected for the future?  The three analogies offer 
competing answers.  If Marbury, understood in originalist terms, pro-
vides the right analogy, then we should expect courts to follow an em-
phatically historicist course, in which the goal of judges, acting as 
amateur historians, is to transplant the original understanding to mod-
ern problems.  This approach is consistent with the thrust of Heller it-
self, but it presents serious conceptual problems.157  It is possible that 
the originalist inquiries, undertaken in radically different circum-
stances, will mask judgments that have a pragmatic component and 
that are driven by a sense of consequences and justifications.  The 
more general point is that if Marbury, as understood here, is the anal-
ogy, the text, interpreted in light of the history, will be the actual as 
well as articulated foundation for future decisions, and the scope of the 
Second Amendment right will turn on history. 
If Heller is to be a rerun of Lochner, then we should expect serious 
and continuing conflicts between the Court and the political process, 
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  157  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 40, at 68–71.    
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with a series of politically controversial invalidations.158  If the Court 
does not track but instead defies popular convictions, the Lochner 
analogy will be closer.  To be sure, it is not imaginable that the Second 
Amendment will be taken to create the same kinds of obstacles to de-
mocratic initiatives as did the Due Process Clause in the Lochner era, 
if only because the scope of the Second Amendment is so much more 
limited.  But it is at least imaginable that judicial invalidations of gun 
control laws will be frequent in the next decade and beyond. 
If the analogy to Griswold holds, the path of the Second Amend-
ment right will be similar to the path of the privacy right.  Despite the 
Heller Court’s emphatic rejection of interest balancing, we should ex-
pect a long series of case-by-case judgments, highly sensitive to par-
ticulars.  The law will follow a minimalist path.  Many judges will 
speak in originalist terms, but contemporary reason and sense, as the 
judges understand them, will play crucial roles.  If Heller is analogous 
to  Griswold, the Court will not use the Second Amendment aggres-
sively as a basis for striking down many gun control laws.  Instead it 
will proceed cautiously, upholding most of the laws now on the books 
and invalidating only the most draconian limitations.  It is very early, 
to be sure, but thus far, the lower courts are taking exactly this path.159 
It should go without saying that, as with the right to privacy, judi-
cial appointments will be crucial.  After all, if Bush v. Gore160 had 
been decided differently, it is most likely that District of Columbia v. 
Heller would have been decided differently as well.161 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Heller is the most explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion 
in the history of the Supreme Court.  Taken at face value, its oldest sa-
lient precursor seems to be Marbury, in which the Court also rested its 
decision on constitutional text and structure.  I do not believe, how-
ever, that Heller can be adequately understood in this way.  The rele-
vant materials are ambiguous rather than clear; no member of the 
Court is a trained historian, and much of its opinion sounds like advo-
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  158  I am greatly oversimplifying the Lochner era here.  Although the Court did strike down im-
portant legislation, it also allowed considerable room for the police power.  For discussion, see 
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18, 2008); Mullenix v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D, 
2008 WL 2620175 (E.D.N.C. July 2,  2008); United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042,  2008 WL 
2622996 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008).  
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cacy or law office history;162 in the historical debate, the Heller opinion 
might have been wrong.  In any event, it remains necessary to explain 
what made it possible for Heller to be issued in 2008, when it would 
not have been imaginable in 1958, 1968, 1978, or even 1988. 
Skeptics will be tempted to see Heller as a triumph of politics and a 
defeat for law.  On their view, the Court’s detailed exploration of text 
and history is a smokescreen for a position that has been pressed hard 
by interest groups and political activists, that the Republican Party en-
thusiastically endorses, and that Republican appointees are likely to 
find congenial.  If this view is correct, the most salient precursor is not 
Marbury but Lochner.  This view can claim support from the fact that 
the Court was split along ideological lines; the most conservative 
members of the Court accepted the robust understanding of the Sec-
ond Amendment right.  But purely on the original understanding, 
Heller stands on plausible grounds — far more so than did Lochner.  
The Court did not, and could not, defend the invalidation of maxi-
mum hour laws by reference to text, structure, and history.  At the 
very least, the Heller Court made a sustained effort to do so.  If the 
flaw of Lochner consists in the Court’s invocation of ambiguous consti-
tutional text to strike down legislation, then Heller is indeed close to 
Lochner.  But few people believe that it is always illegitimate for the 
Court to strike down legislation when the relevant provision of the 
Constitution is ambiguous.  To be sure, Lochner and Heller will seem 
closely analogous to those who believe in a democracy-reinforcing ap-
proach to judicial review. 
At first glance, it is jarring to suggest that Heller is a modern coun-
terpart to Griswold.  The two decisions seem to come from different 
jurisprudential universes.  In originalist terms, there is nothing like a 
simple or clear defense of Griswold, and it would not be possible to 
produce a Heller-style opinion on its behalf.  Nonetheless, the two rul-
ings have a great deal in common.  Both were made possible by a na-
tional consensus, which they simultaneously reflected.  Both struck 
down a law that amounted to a national outlier.  Despite their sweep-
ing rhetoric, both had important minimalist features, ensuring that the 
content of the relevant right will be specified over time.  It is clear that 
as it has developed, the right to privacy has had a great deal to do 
with contemporary convictions, not with the judgments of those long 
dead.  Notwithstanding Heller’s barely qualified originalism,163 I be-
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pass muster as serious historical writing.”  Rakove, supra note 39. 
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lieve that the same will prove true of the right to bear arms.  We have 
entered a period of Second Amendment minimalism. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the 
time of the founding. 
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